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Anger & Hundleby’s new fallacy Ad Stuprum – a fallacious appeal to sexuality – is a new and
interesting contribution to scholarship on fallacies. On their view, Ad Stuprum is analogous in
many ways to Ad Baculum (or an appeal to force) in that both can arise as irrelevant appeals to
some material outcome intended to shut off rather than further critical discussion. Despite their
apparent irrelevancy in some contexts, Anger & Hundleby note that both Ad Stuprum and Ad
Baculum can nevertheless be very persuasive in terms of directing behavior, if not critical
thinking. The authors note that where the fallacies appear to be different however is in the way
that Ad Baculum is (always?) negative while Ad Stuprum can occur as either a positive or
negative appeal. Unlike threats of force, which are negative when they are promised, sexual
appeals, as the authors describe them, are negative when they are withheld and positive when
they are promised.
What I found most compelling about Anger & Hundleby’s analysis is their attention to
the significant absence of sexuality as a component of human experience in theories of fallacious
reasoning. Philosophers have long chronicled the variety of human appeals to emotions and
desires including fear, shame, pity, threat of physical force, popularity, disaster, and pride. Anger
& Hundleby make a good case for more research into the gendered nature of emotional appeals
since the absence of sex as a tool for persuasion highlights traditional masculine concerns with
appeals to authority, popularity, domination, manipulation, and control. Since sexuality, in a
traditionally heteronormative context, involves men interacting with women, mistakes in
reasoning about sex seem to have been relegated to the “private” sphere of negotiation and thus
have not garnered the same attention as “manly” public pursuits like political speeches, market
negotiations, and policy debates. Errors in reasoning in the bedroom could be understood as
“natural” and highly subjective since men were acting primarily from desire and were, after all,
dealing with women. Errors in the boardroom, or the public sphere on the other hand, were
recorded and countered with a cold dispassionate logic so as to avoid high stakes public blunders
between men. Yet as Anger & Hundleby point out, sex sells and pervades culture and blurs the
boundary between public and private. An analysis of sexual appeals is for this reason a welcome
and fruitful area for research in argumentation theory.
I will just raise one question in the hopes of generating further discussion of Anger &
Hundleby’s thought provoking analysis and it stems from the comparison they make to the Ad
Baculum fallacy coupled with their use of Walton’s account of fallacies. The question I have
comes after considering two of the examples provided by Anger & Hundleby intended to
illustrate Ad Stuprum appeals. Specifically I want to consider the Lysistrata case and the Sluts
Against Harper case. In the first, the women of Greece vow to withhold sex from the men
fighting so as to motivate an end to the Peloponnesian War. Anger & Hundleby describe this as
“an excellent example of a negative appeal to sexuality.” What is not clear to me is that this is a
persuasive use of a sexual appeal rather than a move in a negotiation. Walton, in his 1992 paper
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11 th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
pp. 1-3.
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“Which of the Fallacies are Fallacies of Relevance” offers an example of a clear negotiation case
where an Ad Baculum appeal is not fallacious. The case involves a union representative
threatening a strike if management does not meet a particular demand. On the other hand,
Walton notes that a supervisor threatening to fire an employee who disagrees with a policy under
review is, on Walton’s view, a clearly fallacious appeal to force because the context requires
critical discussion and the supervisor is using force to prevent it. Walton writes, “As noted,
indirect threats are a commonplace part of bargaining in negotiations between union and
management. In such a context, an indirect threat is not only a kind of practical argumentation
that is normally expected, but it is also not necessarily a fallacy either. Rather, the threat is
fallacious from the point of view of the critical discussion.” (p. 248)
A negotiation entails a certain kind of parity between negotiators. To negotiate means
that each party has something the other values and so conflicting demands have to be ironed out
and compromises made. Critical discussion contexts shift the dialogue from a focus on demands
and compromise to one that tracks truth and imminent value. Personal power and resources
should not dictate the course of a critical discussion and when they do, it is often in the form of a
fallacious appeal like a supervisor threatening those he supervises. What is tricky about the
Lysistrata case, and the case of women in general for the past two thousand years, is that they
held very little, if any, public power and the promise of sexuality was one of few things they
could use as a tool for negotiation. That makes the Lysistrata case perhaps more like the case of
the union workers rather than the supervisor. What I am suggesting is that fallacious Ad
Baculum appeals require the person committing the fallacy to have some power over those they
threaten, otherwise it would not be a threat. Now the threat could be purely physical power but
also clearly social, political, or economic power. If an individual or group lacks power in most
every relevant sense but one, withholding that one advantage seems to be a matter of negotiation
rather than a move to shut off critical discourse. This is because critical discussion requires
moving from a context of power to one of reasons. Historically oppressed groups, like the
women in Lysistrata, have not been invited into such contexts because their lack of power was
essential to how they were defined. If they were part of critical discussions, they were not
women. Hence the women in Lysistrata were not negatively appealing to sexuality as a form of
coercion but rather, as I read it, a form of negotiation playing their one and only card.
To a lesser extent, the Sluts Against Harper campaign that included women and men, was
nevertheless led by young attractive women who in fact shared a majority of photographs of
young women. I would argue that the group would not have had the popularity it had (it went
viral with thousands and thousands of requests) were it not for the great number of people who
desire nude photographs of young women. In this way, though it was a more positive and
empowered campaign of sexuality, the Sluts Against Harper organizers traded upon the same
single negotiating tactic as the women of Lysistrata. They wanted the public and political
outcome to change and traded upon their sexuality and the sexual desires of a public eager to see
nude women, to affect that outcome. If young women’s public power traded upon something
more than or in addition to sexuality, and the public’s desire to see women in sexualized contexts
was less than it is, the campaign would not have gone viral. To emphasize this point imagine a
campaign to turn out the vote that relied upon erotic photos of men in the U.S. who were
millionaires and billionaires. While such a campaign might attract attention for its novelty, it is
hard to imagine that it would go viral with a backlog of requests for more and more photos.
Hence, like the Lysistrata case, I wonder if a woman’s public appeal to sexuality in either
positive or negative ways can ever be analyzed as something other than a negotiation. To put it
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simply: Are there critical discussion contexts where women hold equal or comparable power
with men such that they are capable of committing the Ad Stuprum fallacy? Or is it the case that
the fallacy could only truly occur in interpersonal critical discussion contexts between equal
partners (their sexual identity irrelevant) where one promises (or withholds) sex when the issue is
whether or not to say, purchase this life insurance, or invest in a particular mutual fund? In other
words, a context that clearly requires non-sexual reasons shared between two equal partners who
are not negotiating but assessing the worth or value of a particular course of action. Something
like, “Honey you should invest in this equity fund with me because if you do, I will make you
very happy later.” Somehow even in this kind of equitable intimate context the Ad Stuprum
appeal still seems to me like a negotiation and the person saying it, lacking power in some other
important area of the relationship.
None of this is to say that the insight and potential fruitfulness of considering fallacious
appeals to sexuality is diminished by my questions. Rather, complex questions about how gender
and power work in the context of negotiations as compared with critical discussions seem to be
needed to add further “flesh” to the bones of our theories of fallacies.
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